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GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR SECURITIES 
HOLDING INFRASTRUCTURES:
A SOFT LAW/FINTECH MODEL FOR REFORM
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.*
I. Introduction
This Article outlines a “soft-law-to-hard-law” approach for the devel-
opment and implementation of reforms to systems for the holding of public-
ly traded securities. It proposes the development of global standards for se-
curities holding systems (“Global Standards”), to be led by the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (the “IOSCO”).1 This approach 
contemplates that States would be encouraged and expected to implement 
the Global Standards by adopting “hard law” reforms through statutory and 
regulatory adjustments to their securities holding systems as well as modifi-
cations of the architecture of their securities holding systems. The successes 
of past IOSCO initiatives inspire this Article’s proposal, as do the relatively 
successful development and implementation of harmonized standards for 
supervision and capital adequacy for depository institutions (for example, 
banks) through the operation of the Basel Committee.2
* Charles A. Heimbold, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. I wish to thank the participants in the symposium The Role of “Soft Law” in Interna-
tional Insolvency and Commercial Law, sponsored by the International Insolvency Institute 
and the University of Michigan Law School, September 21–22, 2018, for helpful comments 
on a presentation of an outline of this Article. I also express my appreciation to Francisco 
Garcimartín, Sarah Hammer, Thomas Keijser, Kumiko Koens, and Andrea Tosato for helpful 
conversations. The conclusions reached here and any errors are mine alone, however. I also 
thank Penn Law for generous support during the preparation of this Article.
1. For background on the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“IOSCO”), see generally OICV-IOSCO, https://www.iosco.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2019). 
For discussions of the nature of and distinctions between “soft” and “hard” law see, e.g., Su-
san Block-Lieb, Soft and Hard Strategies in the Crafting of International Commercial Law,
40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433 (2019); Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Use of Soft Law in the Creation of 
Legal Norms in International Commercial Law: How Successful Has It Been?, 40 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 413 (2019); John A. E. Pottow, The Dialogic Aspect of Soft Law in International In-
solvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 479 (2019); Irit Me-
vorach, A Fresh View on the Hard/Soft Law Divide: Implications for International Insolvency 
of Enterprise Groups, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 505 (2019).
I refer to the Global Standards discussed here as “soft” law to indicate that they would 
not have the force of law unless and until implemented by a State. See infra note 51 (discuss-
ing soft law aspects of the proposed Global Standards).
2. The Basel Committee operates under the auspices of the Bank for International Set-
tlements in Basel, Switzerland. For background, see MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 272–74 (2016). For later developments, see id. at 285–331. 
For additional discussion of the Basel Committee, see infra Part V.
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Intermediaries play central—indeed essential—roles in the holding sys-
tems addressed in this Article and in the securities markets more generally. 
In particular, they are necessary players in existing systems for trading (for 
example, on exchanges and other trading platforms) and settling trades of 
securities.3 In most financial markets, the systems for holding securities af-
ter trades have settled are intermediated holding systems. Securities are 
transferred to and acquired by investors, as beneficial owners, through elec-
tronic credits to their securities accounts held with intermediaries such as 
stockbrokers and banks.
Intermediated holding systems are amalgams of information technolo-
gy, regulatory constraints, contractual terms, and private law. For present 
purposes, the relevant private law embraces respect for contractual obliga-
tions, legally imposed rights and duties, and proprietary rights and interests 
in securities.4 In general, this private law is embodied in laws governing 
shares in corporations and in the laws governing debt securities. It also en-
compasses the rights and interests—if any—of an investor vis-a-vis the is-
suer of securities and the rights and interests acquired by an account holder 
upon the credit of securities to a securities account. All intermediated hold-
ing systems necessarily involve some degree of intermediation between is-
suers of securities and investors holding securities as account holders.5 This 
intermediation necessarily imposes some risk—intermediary risk—
consisting of the risk of loss or damage to an investor arising out of the de-
fault or insolvency of an intermediary. Intermediary risk is a function of the 
structure of a particular holding system, including the holding infrastructure 
and its relevant technology, the relevant private law of property and con-
tract, legal and contractual duties that underpin the holding structure, the 
regulatory framework, and the relevant insolvency laws.
IOSCO has recently addressed intermediary risk in two important re-
ports on the protection of client assets (“Client Asset Reports”).6 While it 
3. The settlement of trades involves the transfer, generally referred to as a “delivery,”
of securities against payment for the securities.
4. One standard definition of “private law” is: “That portion of the law that defines, 
regulates, enforces, and administers relationships among individuals, associations, and corpo-
rations. As used in distinction to public law, the term means that part of the law that is admin-
istered between citizen and citizen, or that is concerned with the definition, regulation, and 
enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in whom the right inheres and the person 
upon whom the obligation rests are private individuals.” West’s Encyclopedia of American 
Law (2d ed. 2008), https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/private+law (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2019).
5. In general, references to an “investor” mean the beneficial owner holding in an in-
termediated holding system as an account holder. References to an “account holder” also en-
compass those who hold in an intermediated system as an intermediary or otherwise on behalf 
of investors.
6. IOSCO, RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CLIENT ASSETS 
(2014), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD436.pdf [hereinafter 2014
IOSCO REPORT]; IOSCO, THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE ADOPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES SET 
FORTH IN IOSCO’S REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CLIENT 
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seems clear that intermediary risk should be an important focus of the pro-
posed Global Standards, the proposal here contemplates an approach to 
holding systems that is broader and more holistic than that taken in the Cli-
ent Asset Reports. The analysis of intermediary risk should consider the in-
formation technology infrastructure employed for the operation of a holding 
system, the relevant regulatory regime, the applicable private law, and in-
solvency laws.7 It should also consider the potential for disintermediation 
that would essentially eliminate intermediary risk from securities holding 
systems. The principal goal of this Article is to make the case for Global 
Standards pursuant to an IOSCO-led soft-law-to-hard-law enterprise. How-
ever, a detailed explication of the appropriate specific content of the Global 
Standards is beyond the scope of this Article.
Finally, development of Global Standards should take account of the 
rapidly evolving financial technology, or Fintech.8 As George Walker has 
summarized this phenomenon:
[FinTech] has emerged as a powerful new market force as a result 
of the coming together of a number of disconnected trends. Signifi-
cant advances have occurred in the areas of computer and digital 
technology, the Internet, mobile telecommunications, and econom-
ics and finance, which have transformed traditional areas of study 
and created important potential new business structures and opera-
tions.9
ASSETS ((2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD577.pdf [hereinafter 
2017 IOSCO REPORT]. References to the “client” in this context refer to an investor/account 
holder holding through an intermediated holding system.
7. See infra Part IV (discussing intermediary risk and the potential scope of the Global 
Standards). Recognizing this possibility of disintermediation, in general, references here are to 
“holding systems” instead of “intermediated holding systems.” By focusing here on holding 
systems, I do not intend to suggest that reforms that would reduce risk and enhance efficiency 
in trading platforms and settlement systems should not also be addressed—they should.
8. As described in Investopedia: “Fintech is used to describe new tech that seeks to 
improve and automate the delivery and use of financial services. At its core, fintech is utilized 
to help companies, business owners and consumers better manage their financial operations,
processes and lives by utilizing specialized software and algorithms that are used on comput-
ers and, increasingly, smartphones. . . When fintech emerged in the 21st Century, the term 
was initially applied to technology employed at the back-end systems of established financial 
institutions. Since then, however, there has been a shift to more consumer-oriented services 
and therefore a more consumer-oriented definition. Fintech has expanded to include any tech-
nological innovation in — and automation of — the financial sector, including advances in 
financial literacy, advice and education, as well as streamlining of wealth management, lend-
ing and borrowing, retail banking, fundraising, money transfers/payments, investment man-
agement and more.” Julia Kagan, Fintech, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/f/fintech.asp#ixzz4aZxr0YMG (last updated Mar. 13, 2019).
9. George Walker, Financial Technology Law: A New Beginning and a New Future,
34 GPSOLO 76, 76 (2017). For an interesting and thorough analysis of Fintech that “takes a 
deeper and more encompassing systemic view of fintech, both as a financial market phenome-
non and as a regulatory challenge,” see Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as 
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Indeed, the potential of distributed ledger technology (“DLT,” also known 
as “blockchain”) has assumed an important, even dominant, role in the cur-
rent discussions of the evolution of the financial markets.10
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Article provides an overview 
of various typical types of securities holding infrastructures as they exist to-
day. Part III summarizes the roles of private law and the regulation of mar-
kets and market participants as they relate to securities holding systems. It 
also describes certain reform efforts in recent years. Part IV outlines a case 
for reforming securities holding infrastructures. Although a full analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Article, Part IV explains that the prospect for re-
ducing intermediary risk and the emerging role of Fintech provide support 
for the approach advocated here. Part V considers the possible content of 
Global Standards for securities holding infrastructures that would be devel-
oped by an IOSCO-led soft-law-to-hard-law project and the need for a mis-
sion statement for the project. Part VI concludes.
II. Overview of Intermediated Securities 
Holding Infrastructures
There are many different types of intermediated securities holding in-
frastructures. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(“UNIDROIT”) Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities (“Legislative 
Guide”) identifies five general models of holding systems.11 While the mod-
els have much in common, they reflect variations on the proprietary rights 
in securities and the legal relationships among account holders,12 their rele-
a Systemic Phenomenon 4 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 18-39, 
2018), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3224393.
10. See, e.g., Philipp Paech, The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks, 80 
MOD. L. REV. 1073 (2017) (discussing adaptation of private law, regulatory regimes, and pri-
vate international law (choice of law) to financial markets consisting of distributed ledger 
technology (“DLT”)-based networks). Neither of the Client Asset Reports discusses Fintech 
or the potential role of DLT and other emerging technologies as potential tools for managing 
or eliminating intermediary risk. However, given the discrete goal of recommending im-
provements to holding systems as they exist, these Fintech issues and developments may ap-
propriately be considered beyond the scope of those reports.
11. Unidroit Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities 16–22 (2017), 
https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/legislative-guide [hereinafter Legisla-
tive Guide]. The following description of these holding structures is drawn from the discus-
sion in the Legislative Guide. The descriptions are general and illustrate the principal differ-
ences among the various systems that are relevant to this discussion but do not cover all of the 
many details of each system. I omit discussion here of one of the models, the “contractual 
model,” because it does not confer on an account holder a private-law proprietary interest, and 
its effectiveness as a holding structure depends largely on the treatment of account holders in 
the insolvency of a relevant intermediary. See id. at 21–22.
12. The Legislative Guide’s Glossary provides helpful definitions. It defines “[a]ccount 
holder” as “[a] person in whose name an intermediary maintains a securities account, whether 
that person is acting for its own account or for others (including in the capacity of intermedi-
ary).” Id. at xxi.
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vant intermediaries,13 and a central securities depositary (“CSD”).14 The in-
dividual ownership model, used in countries such as France, contemplates 
that the investor (that is, the ultimate account holder at the bottom tier) has 
complete ownership of the securities credited to its account.15 Correspond-
ingly, neither the CSD nor any other intermediaries in the holding chain has 
any interest in the securities. Other countries such as Austria and Germany 
use the co-ownership model, which involves the deposit of a global security 
certificate with the CSD.16 The CSD credits the accounts of its account 
holders (its “participants”) with their respective units of the relevant securi-
ty, and the participants in turn credit the accounts of their account holders.17
The ultimate account holder has a co-ownership of its share of the pooled 
securities held at the CSD.
The trust model—used in Australia, England and Wales, and Ireland—
provides that the CSD acts as the register for the issuers of securities.18 The 
CSD itself has no interest in the securities, but it credits its participants with 
their respective units of the securities. The participants are the legal owners 
of the securities, either for their own accounts or for the benefit of their ac-
count holders. The participants credit securities to their account holders’ ac-
counts and act as trustees for their account holders. As trust beneficiaries, 
the account holders have a beneficial, equitable interest in the securities. In 
Canada and the United States, the security entitlement model provides that 
every account holder in the holding chain, including participants of the 
CSD, acquires a security entitlement.19 A security entitlement confers sui 
generis rights against the relevant intermediary and to the securities held by 
the intermediary.20 Account holders (“entitlement holders”) do not have di-
rect rights against the issuers of securities.
Securities holding systems are also classified as “transparent” or “non-
transparent” systems.21 As described in the Legislative Guide, in a transpar-
ent system,
an investor’s holdings are identified by, or known to, the CSD pri-
marily because the role of maintaining a securities account is 
shared between the CSD (which is the relevant intermediary . . . ) 
13. See id. at xxvii (defining “[r]elevant intermediary” as “[t]he intermediary that, in 
relation to a securities account, maintains that securities account for the account holder.”).
14. See id. at xxii (defining “[c]entral securities depository (CSD)” as “[a]n entity that 
provides the initial recording of securities in a book-entry system or that provides and main-
tains the securities accounts at the top tier of the intermediated holding chain.”).
15. Id. at 17.
16. Id. at 18.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 22.
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and other persons often called account operators, who are securities 
firms maintaining commercial relationships with investors.22
The Legislative Guide identifies three general types of transparent systems. 
In the first type, each investor holds securities in a separate account with the 
CSD.23 Intermediaries (referred to as “account operators”) operate the ac-
counts and act as interfaces between the investor and the CSD. In a second 
type of transparent system, an investor holds securities in an account with 
an intermediary at the CSD level.24 The intermediary’s account with the 
CSD has a sub-account for each investor that reflects the investor’s hold-
ings. A third type of transparent system involves an omnibus account of the 
intermediary with the CSD.25 The intermediary maintains a separate account 
for each of its investors. Information as to the investor accounts is consoli-
dated as between the CSD and the intermediary so that the CSD can ascer-
tain each investor’s holdings. In a forthcoming chapter, Thomas Keijser and 
I advance and defend our claim that the adoption and implementation of a 
transparent information technology system for securities holding could pro-
vide substantial benefits, even without any change in law.26 We also argue 
that implementing a transparent information technology system could serve 
as a catalyst and a roadmap for law reforms affecting securities holding sys-
tems.27
Each of these securities holding systems takes a different approach to 
the relevant private law. In particular, they vary as to who holds proprietary 
rights and as to the nature of those rights. But each also generally protects 
the rights of account holders against claims of general creditors in case of 
the insolvency of a relevant intermediary. Even so, a relevant intermediary’s 
insolvency proceeding nonetheless could impose material risks with respect 
to the prompt realization of an account holder’s rights in respect of securi-
ties.28
22. Id.
23. Id. at 22–24.
24. Id. at 23–24.
25. Id. at 24–25.
26. Thomas Keijser & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Intermediated Securities Holding Sys-
tems Revisited: A View Through The Prism Of Transparency, in INTERMEDIATION AND 
BEYOND 309 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019).
27. Id. at 331–35. As a corollary, we explain that non-transparent information technol-
ogy systems are sources of or contributors to various problems in securities holding systems. 
Id.
28. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & Guy Morton, Harmonizing Insolvency Law for 
Intermediated Securities: The Way Forward, in TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 193
(Thomas Keijser ed., 2013) (explaining inter alia the difficulties and complexities presented 
for account holders in the event of a relevant intermediary insolvency, with examples and les-
sons drawn from the insolvency proceedings in New York for Lehman Brothers Holdings, 
Inc. (holding company of the Lehman group) and Lehman Brothers, Inc. (the United States 
broker-dealer) and in London for Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (Lehman’s primary 
European broker)).
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III. The Roles of Private Law and Market Regulation In 
Securities Holding Infrastructures And Initiatives For Reform
Private law features of the various securities holding systems summa-
rized above play a paramount role in the operation of the securities markets 
and the securities holding infrastructures on which such markets are based. 
The same is also true for the levels of transparency in the various types of 
holding systems. Whether an investor holds directly with an issuer or 
through an intermediary, there necessarily exists a relationship of some 
market participant—whether a CSD, another intermediary, or an investor—
with the issuer. For equity (for example, shares) in a corporation, this in-
volves corporation or company law, and for debt securities (for example, 
bonds or notes), it involves the law governing the issuer’s obligations and 
the contractual terms of the securities. Most significantly, of course, an in-
vestor expects to acquire a proprietary interest in the securities.
Each of the prototypical intermediated holding structures summarized 
above contemplates in some fashion the existence and nature of an account 
holder’s proprietary interest. But the structures vary enormously as to the 
location and nature of the proprietary interests of the various market partici-
pants. Moreover, these applicable private law rules achieve much more than 
a determination of private rights. They provide the “plumbing” on which the 
infrastructure for trading, settlement, and holding securities are grounded.29
These private law regimes “can play a significant role in reducing not only 
legal risks of market participants but systemic risk as well.”30 This metaphor 
conceiving of private law as the “plumbing” for securities holding structures 
is necessarily and importantly supplemented by regulatory regimes for secu-
rities markets and market participants that provide a framework for linking 
together the operational components of holding systems. This is due in large 
part to the ubiquitous presence and important role of regulated intermediar-
ies such as securities firms (for example, stockbrokers and dealers) and 
banks in securities holding systems as well as the generally accepted need 
for regulation and supervision of securities markets more generally.
The Client Asset Reports of IOSCO reflect this crucial role of regula-
tion. However, the Reports generally fail to address the reductions of inter-
mediary risk that could result from improvements in intermediated holdings 
systems in the areas of private law, technological infrastructures, transpar-
ency (or non-transparency), and insolvency law. They generally accept the 
fundamental characteristics of the various holding systems and private law 
regimes essentially as they exist. On this assumption, the Client Asset Re-
ports propose and defend a variety of sound prophylactic measures for pro-
29. Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & Hideki Kanda, Core Issues Under the UNIDROIT (Ge-
neva) Convention on Intermediated Securities: Views from the United States and Japan, in
INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 69, 76 (Louise 
Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2010).
30. Id. (citing and quoting draft recommendations prepared by a group organized by the 
European System of Central Banks and the Committee of European Securities Regulators).
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tecting client assets. The Global Standards proposed here would abandon 
that assumption and extend their reach to the private law and to all other as-
pects of holding infrastructures.31
The past several decades have witnessed numerous efforts—on national 
and international levels—to harmonize, rationalize, and reform both the pri-
vate law principles and the infrastructures for the settlement of trades and 
the holding of securities.32 The wide variety of intermediated holding struc-
tures described in Part II reflect the results of some of these efforts on the 
national levels. But efforts for harmonization and reform on the internation-
al level have been met with very limited success. This is so notwithstanding 
enormous efforts in connection with three significant projects—the Hague 
Securities Convention (“HSC”),33 the Geneva Securities Convention 
(“GSC”),34 and the European Legal Certainty project.35 Of course, each of 
these projects contributed substantially to knowledge and common under-
standing; declaring them to be failures would be too harsh a judgment. That 
none of them has resulted in meaningful harmonization results in part from 
the widely differing securities holding systems, regulatory philosophies, and 
private law traditions. This suggests the need for a fresh approach that dif-
fers from these “traditional” processes for the development and harmoniza-
tion of hard law (such as international conventions, EU directives or regula-
tions, or model law texts). The development of Global Standards advocated 
in Part V reflects such a new approach.
IOSCO’s Client Asset Reports were inspired in part by “[e]vents in re-
cent years including the Lehman Brothers and MF Global insolvencies 
[that] have placed client asset protection regimes in the spotlight.”36 The 
2014 IOSCO Report provided eight principles intended to apply as between 
an intermediary and its clients (that is, account holders) and to provide pro-
31. See text at supra nn. 29–30 (discussing role of private law in reducing risks of mar-
ket participants as well as systemic risk). The approach of the Geneva Securities Convention 
and the European Legal Certainty project generally assumed the continuation of existing 
structures for securities holding, but the Global Standards advocated here would not be so 
constrained.
32. See MATTHIAS HAENTJENS, HARMONISATION OF SECURITIES LAW 217 (Martijn 
Hesselink et al. eds., 2007) (discussing harmonization initiatives).
33. Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held 
with an Intermediary, Intermediary, July 5, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 17-401401.
34. Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, Oct. 9, 2009, 
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/geneva-convention [hereinafter GSC]; 
see also Legislative Guide, supra note 11. The Legislative Guide recognizes that there are 
many gaps in the GSC’s scope and substance that were left to the non-Convention law. Id. at 
35–36. It offers guidance to states as to areas in need of legislative and regulatory treatment, 
which were not fully addressed and harmonized in the GSC. Id.
35. See Legal Certainty Group, Second Advice of the Legal Certainty Group: Solutions 
to Legal Barriers Related to Post-Trading Within the EU, (2008), https://ec.europa.eu/info/
system/files/legal-certainty-group-2nd-advice_en.pdf.
36. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 1. 
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tections for assets (for example, securities) held in securities accounts.37 The 
principles relate to matters including record keeping, account statements, 
safeguarding clients’ rights and minimizing risks of loss and misuse of as-
sets, understanding and dealing with assets in foreign jurisdictions, clear 
disclosures of protections regimes and risks involved, arrangements relating 
to client waivers of protections, regulatory oversight of intermediary com-
pliance, and regulatory oversight of domestic rules concerning foreign as-
sets.38 These principles reflect the crucial roles played by intermediaries and 
the related regulatory regimes. For example, the operative language of six of 
the principles includes the phrase “intermediary should” in them.39 For two 
of the principles, the language includes a “regulator should” in them.40 A
final principle addresses what “arrangements should” provide in connection 
with client waivers or modifications of protections.41
The 2017 IOSCO Report documents the success of the recommenda-
tions and the enormous influence of IOSCO in respect of the thirty-six par-
ticipating jurisdictions. It concluded that “the majority of participating juris-
dictions have generally adopted a client asset protection regime described 
by the Principles.”42
For present purposes, the Client Asset Reports support each of two os-
tensibly—but not actually—conflicting claims made here. The first claim is 
quite obvious: The Client Asset Reports and the various States’ actions 
based on and in response to the Client Asset Reports represent important 
steps in reducing the most significant risk imposed by currently existing se-
curities holding structures—intermediary risk.43 Along this path toward risk 
reduction, the Client Asset Reports also provide an excellent example 
among many44 of the expertise and quality of analysis that IOSCO is capa-
ble of marshaling. Second, while the Client Asset Reports and States’ re-
sponses reflect some improvements and reduction of intermediary risk, they 
also clearly demonstrate the continued existence of intermediary risk and, I 
would argue, the need to address it.45 Part IV, next, reconciles and explains 
these claims.
37. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 3–9.
38. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 3–9.
39. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 3–6.
40. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 7–9.
41. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 6.
42. 2017 IOSCO Report, supra note 6, at 32.
43. See supra Part I (discussing intermediary risk).
44. A listing of IOSCO’s public reports may be found at Public Reports, INT’L ORG.
SEC. COMMISSIONS https://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=public_reports (last visit-
ed Mar. 28, 2019).
45. I should acknowledge (but without apologies) that I have changed my views as to 
the inevitability of intermediary risk in this context. Once upon a time, I supported reforms of 
the intermediated holding systems under prevailing law in the United States that centered on 
the identification and management of intermediary risk. The reforms that I proposed, support-
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IV. The Case for Reforming Securities Holding 
Infrastructures: Reduction or Elimination Of Intermediary 
Risk and The Emergence of Fintech
Making and supporting the case for further reforms of securities holding 
structures is beyond the modest scope and permissible length of this Article. 
Instead, a brief but (hopefully) clear and straightforward outline must suf-
fice. In other work, Kumiko Koens and I suggest that Fintech may offer an 
avenue for eliminating intermediary risk in securities holding systems.46
While the Client Asset Reports and the principles that they advance address 
and evaluate the reduction of intermediary risk, each of the principles is a 
mirror image of the persistence of the risks that continue to exist. In the ab-
sence of such risks, these principles would be unnecessary. The fundamental 
sources of this risk are the indispensable roles of intermediaries in securities 
transactions and settlement.  Because connecting investors directly with is-
suers as direct holders under legacy systems is cumbersome, time-
consuming, and relatively expensive, for many investors, the only practical 
choice is to hold securities through an intermediary.47 The securities thereby 
ed, and accepted assumed the existence of intermediary risk as a given in the securities market 
infrastructure. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and 
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 388 
(1990) (“It appears that the single, most powerful, control that a market participant can em-
ploy to reduce intermediary risk is to exercise precaution by selecting an intermediary that 
will not fail.”). That article had considerable influence, which persists almost three decades 
later. Philipp Paech has cited this work as “the first . . . to analyse the legal consequences of”
the emergence of “the concept of securities intermediation through banks and brokers” in the 
United States. Philipp Paech, Securities, Intermediation and the Blockchain: An Inevitable 
Choice Between Liquidity and Legal Certainty?, 21 UNIFORM L. REV. 612, 617 (2016). Fran-
cis Facciolo has noted the significance of the work in the development of law in the United 
States. See Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the Individual In-
vestor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.615, 635 (2000) (“Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., the legal 
academic whose ideas form the intellectual underpinnings of Revised [Uniform Commercial 
Code] Article 8 . . . .”) (footnote omitted); id. at 664 (“Professor Mooney proposed the model 
of ‘upper-tier priority,’ which became the intellectual foundation of Revised Article 8 . . . .”)
(footnote omitted); id. at 669 (“Professor Mooney, the intellectual progenitor Revised Article 
8’s general approach . . . .”); id. at 697 n.473 (“Professor Mooney’s influential article advocat-
ing a complete revision of 1977 Article 8 . . . Professor Mooney brought his own well thought 
out approach to the process of revising 1977 Article 8, one congruent enough to that of the 
federal regulators to be included in the Bankers Trust Company report.”).
46. Professor Koens and I propose a “new platform” holding structure that would elim-
inate intermediary risk in securities holding systems. It would connect ultimate account hold-
ers/investors with issuers of securities—a direct holding structure. This connection, as the last 
step in the settlement process and possibly employing DLT, would replace the credit of secu-
rities to a securities account held with an intermediary. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond 
Intermediation: A New (Fintech) Model For Securities Holding Infrastructures (unpublished 
presentation) (outlining “new platform” securities holding structure and arguing that modern 
technology has eliminated the need for intermediation in securities holding structures) (on file 
with author).
47. CSDs in the United States (The Depository Trust Company) and the United King-
dom and Ireland (CREST) provide for connecting investors to direct registration systems for 
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remain in the intermediated system so as to be readily available for trading 
and settlement. The intermediary risk arises because holding securities 
through an intermediary necessarily confers on the intermediary some de-
gree and character of power and control over the securities maintained in a 
securities account. This is so under all of the various holding systems sum-
marized above, whether the intermediary, for example, is the actual or nom-
inal holder of securities in the chain of title, as under law applicable in the 
United States and under English law, or has no such interest, as under 
French law.48 It follows that the only reasons for maintaining this sort of in-
termediation that causes this intermediary risk are the prevailing characteris-
tics of existing holding systems themselves (including cumbersome legacy 
systems of direct holding).
Two related circumstances offer the prospect of eliminating intermedi-
ary risk from securities holding systems. First, Fintech offers the potential 
for new systems of securities holding that could eliminate, reduce, or mate-
rially alter intermediated holding. Second, Fintech developments have 
placed the prospect for fundamental changes in the structure of financial 
markets—including securities trading, settlement, and holding—squarely on 
the table.49 It follows that arguments based on the rationale that “this is the 
way our systems work” may no longer be persuasive, if they ever were. The 
mindsets of major market participants may be evolving.50
Global Standards developed by an IOSCO-led working group would of 
course be soft law, inasmuch as the standards would not be formulated with-
in a legislative body or a governmental agency and would not have any 
binding force until adopted by States.51 But the standards would be “soft 
equity (but not debt) securities. See Direct Registration System, DEPOSITORY TR. &
CLEARING CORP., http://www.dtcc.com/settlement-and-asset-services/securities-processing/
direct-registration-system (last visited Mar. 28, 2019); Euroclear UK & Ireland: Personal 
Membership, EUROCLEAR, https://www.euroclear.com/dam/Brochures/Personal-membership-
EUI.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). But associated delay and costs of these systems generally 
make them impractical for use by active investors.
48. See supra Part II (discussing models for intermediated securities holding systems).
49. See, e.g., DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 9–17 (2016),
http://hub.digitalasset.com/hubfs/Industry%20Reports/dtcc-embracing-disruption.pdf [herein-
after DTCC REPORT]; IOSCO, IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES 
(FINTECH) 52–58 (2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [here-
inafter IOSCO FINTECH REPORT].
50. It is notable, however, that the various explorations of Fintech/DLT by major insti-
tutions do not appear to have focused on the potential for the reduction or elimination of in-
termediary risk. For example, neither the DTC Report nor the IOSCO Fintech Report address-
es that potential benefit. DTCC REPORT, supra note 49; IOSCO FINTECH REPORT, supra note 
49.
51. See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 171, 187–88 (2010) (“Examples of this type of soft law abound.”). Of course, an 
international convention also is not binding until such time as it enters into force. But unlike a 
convention (or model law), the Global Standards contemplated here would not consist of har-
monized (or model) statutory text or specific doctrinal rules.
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law” of a special character. Not only would the Global Standards be devel-
oped by an intergovernmental organization, IOSCO, but by an organization 
whose members are the very governmental regulators responsible for ad-
ministering the standards. Global Standards developed by IOSCO would be
sui generis in another aspect. Private law reforms generally have been left to 
other bodies and not seen as a central aspect of regulatory reform. But in the 
context of securities holding infrastructures, this should change. Efforts at 
relevant harmonization and modernization of private law within Europe and 
through UNIDROIT (the GSC) generally have not been met with success. 
This may be contrasted with the success of IOSCO in connection with the 
Client Asset Reports and the success of Basel Committee in the area of bank 
prudential regulation.52 Moreover, the increasing significance of Fintech and 
the potential for DLT to influence future developments make this an appro-
priate time for bold initiatives.53
V. Soft Law Global Standards for Hard Law Reform: A 
Central Role for IOSCO and A Tentative Mission Statement
This Part advocates the development of “soft law” Global Standards for 
the infrastructure for the holding of publicly traded securities. It argues that 
a process led by IOSCO would provide the optimal environment for the de-
velopment of these standards. These Global Standards would be available 
for the adoption by States (“hard law”) as core components of States’ rele-
vant regulatory, technological, and private law infrastructure for securities 
holding.
Two preliminary points should be made clear: first, the proposal for 
IOSCO-led development of Global Standards is supported by, but not de-
pendent upon, the case for reform just made. That reform proposal is an ex-
ample, albeit an important one in my view, of how adjustments in private 
law and holding structures could reduce intermediary risk in securities hold-
ing systems. But the overarching point is that adjustments in the private law 
as well as in regulatory and technological aspects of holding structures 
could improve holding systems. As noted above, the Client Asset Reports 
do not embrace that approach.54
Second, Global Standards could provide guidance and structure for 
Fintech in the context of the securities markets. Experts possessing experi-
ence and knowledge of the securities markets, the legal and regulatory envi-
ronments, and the components of safe and efficient operations are the best 
actors for setting standards for technology to meet. Instead, it seems that, in 
52. See infra Part V.
53. See infra at pp. 18–21(discussing timeliness of developing the Global Standards).
54. See supra Part III (discussing role of private law in reducing risks of market partic-
ipants as well as systemic risk). The approach of the GSC and the European Legal Certainty 
project generally assumed the continuation of existing infrastructures for securities holding. 
But the Global Standards advocated here would not be so constrained.
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some respects, the legal establishment is following technological develop-
ments and structures like apocryphal lemmings jumping off of cliffs.55 This 
approach should be modified and balanced. In many contexts, those with 
market expertise should establish standards and goals and call upon Fintech 
to find solutions.
Several considerations lend strong support for the leading role of 
IOSCO in the soft-law-to-hard-law Global Standards approach proposed 
here and for the timeliness of the proposed reforms of securities holding in-
frastructures. No doubt the strongest data point supporting this central role 
is the success of the implementation of the principles articulated in the Cli-
ent Asset Reports.56 Another is the analogous role and exemplary coopera-
tion of bank regulators in the work of the Basel Committee on capital re-
quirements for commercial banks.57 The 1988 Basel I accord58 has been 
described as “the first major success for international regulatory coopera-
tion,” and it was “widely followed” by bank regulators.59 While subsequent 
iterations (Basel II and III) have encountered a more checkered route, clut-
tered with political realities and fallout from the 2008-09 financial crisis, the 
level of cooperation among regulators has remained strong.60
The Global Standards based on a consensus of relevant State regulators 
would provide a powerful incentive for States to adopt compliant hard law.61
Because the Global Standards would reflect a consensus of governmental 
actors (regulators),62 one might expect much less resistance to adoptions by 
55. Current efforts to assess and deal with legal issues arising out of the custody of dig-
ital assets and problems associated with access through private keys provide an illustration. 
See, e.g., Moe Adham, Crypto Custody Explained, FORBES COMMUNITY VOICE 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2018/12/18/crypto-
custody-explained/#2a3b2f9e1379. I do not suggest that lawyers should not be called upon to 
grapple with these issues; indeed, they must. But, ideally, counsel would be involved in the 
process of creating systems for acquiring, holding, and transferring financial assets to the end 
that these functions could occur without (or with minimal) problems of accessibility or inter-
mediary risk.
56. See supra Part III.
57. See infra nn. 59–60.
58. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf.
59. MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 285. 
60. For a survey of these developments and various related commentary, see MICHAEL 
S. BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 285–332.
61. See Part III (discussing influence of Client Asset Reports and Basel Committee).
62. Given the specialized nature of securities holding infrastructures, buy-in by a 
state’s securities regulators would be important, probably essential, for a state’s adoption of 
the Global Standards. The IOSCO pedigree could encourage such support. Moreover, the 
roles of commercial banks, bank regulators, and central banks are also important in the setting 
of the securities markets and, in particular, in connection with settlement and holding struc-
tures. One would hope that the Basel Committee, central banks, and other representatives of 
the banking industry would play a role in the development of the Global Standards by IOSCO. 
There are many examples of such cooperation between banking interests and IOSCO in past 
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States than would typically be the case with a convention or model law or 
principles adopted by a more generalist, less specialized intergovernmental 
organization. The expertise, reputation, and past successes of IOSCO prod-
ucts (such as the Client Asset Reports) also would contribute to the influ-
ence of the Global Standards. Moreover, unlike the GSC, the Global Stand-
ards would not dictate a harmonized, uniform text but would instead offer 
general principles that could accommodate the prevailing wide variations in 
legal traditions, regulatory approaches, and holding infrastructures. This 
may be contrasted with the absence of success of the GSC (at least as meas-
ured by the absence of adoptions) and the breakdown of harmonization and 
modernization efforts within the EU.63 That said, IOSCO would not be em-
barking on the project on a clean slate. Its own work, reflected by the Client 
Asset Reports, as well as the prior efforts leading to the GSC, the Legisla-
tive Guide, and the European Legal Certainty project provide enormously 
useful points of departure.
Professor Cally Jordan recently criticized IOSCO’s international stand-
ard-setting role as well as its process for the formulation of standards. She 
argued that IOSCO’s role as a “quasi-regulator” is “on a collision course 
with powerful state-level regulators.”64 While I take exception with several 
aspects of Jordan’s assessment and conclusions, this Article does not engage 
that debate. It is sufficient to note that the IOSCO role in developing the 
Global Standards, which is advocated here, could escape the principal criti-
cisms that Jordan has advanced. For example, consider the goal of reducing, 
or perhaps eliminating, intermediary risk in securities holding structures. 
The Global Standards should eschew the “one-size-fits-all” approach that
Jordan assails.65 Moreover, the Global Standards should focus on the con-
tent of the standards, which should not be subordinated to the goal of har-
monization.66 In addition, the development of the Global Standards should 
projects. See, e.g., IOSCO, Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies, FR12/2017(July 
5, 2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD570.pdf (Released by: the 
Bank for International Settlements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Committee 
on Payments and Market Infrastructures), the Financial Stability Board, and IOSCO).
63. See supra Part III.
64. CALLY JORDAN, THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM? IOSCO, INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS AND CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 1 (Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation 
Papers No. 189, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3257800 [herein-
after NEW INTERNATIONALISM]; see also CALLY JORDAN, BEYOND INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS: MAPPING THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 5 (Ctr. for Int’l
Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 136, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3258456 [hereinafter MAPPING]. For a more positive view of interna-
tional financial regulatory coordination, see HADAR YOANA JABOTINSKY & BARAK 
YARKONI, THE NETWORK EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION (Hebrew U. 
Legal. Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 19-04, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298597 (explaining positive network effects that induce States to 
adopt global financial regulatory standards).
65. NEW INTERNATIONALISM, supra note 64, at 6.
66. NEW INTERNATIONALISM, supra note 64, at 5.
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involve participation by a broadly representative group of stakeholders and 
experts, including in particular academics, research institutions, and other 
intergovernmental organizations.67
This is a propitious time for the development of Global Standards, as 
explained above. This is so in part because of the prominence of Fintech in-
terests in the current discourse within the financial markets.68 The emerging 
significance of DLT-based technology and its potentially disruptive impact 
are particularly important. A diverse group of players are considering the 
ways that DLT might be applied in the context of securities trading, settle-
ment, and holding.69 Minds—and purses—may be opening to the possibili-
ties of fundamental changes in financial market architectures.
Finally, what matters should the Global Standards address? What 
should be their substantive content? What level of detail should they em-
brace? In short, what should be the mission statement? This Article does not 
aspire to provide comprehensive and detailed answers to these questions, 
but the somewhat abstract proposal advanced thus far would benefit from 
some further explication. What I do not have in mind is any duplication of 
initiatives of the Fintech community or of the various initiatives of market 
participants and regulators in the Fintech sphere. Instead, the Global Stand-
ards would provide normative and functional guidance for what it is that 
Fintech should achieve and the results to which it should aspire.
I also do not envision the need for any sharp dichotomy between “regu-
latory” and “private law” approaches to the standards. In general, however, 
earlier projects would provide useful points of departure. For example, the 
principles embodied in the GSC and the alternatives outlined in the Legisla-
tive Guide represent plausible baselines for discussion from the perspective 
of private law. That the rules reflected in the GSC text are not “new” does 
not offer a plausible objection to including them (as appropriate and as may 
be agreed) in the Global Standards. The point is that they have not been 
universally implemented, and the Global Standards could be a more suc-
cessful means of implementation than an international convention. The Cli-
ent Asset Reports offer similar reference points on important regulatory as-
pects. A significant challenge could be to encourage IOSCO to take on the 
task of considering the need to modify private law and the standards for se-
curities holding infrastructures as integral components of the Global Stand-
ards. Another challenge would be the development of Global Standards that 
incorporate functional standards and sufficient flexibility for the evolution 
of infrastructures to take advantage of emerging (and evolving) technology 
while also providing sufficiently concrete guidance as to the outcomes and 
performance required for holding systems to be compliant. A third chal-
lenge would be to preserve the flexibility and nimbleness of existing inter-
67. See MAPPING, supra note 64, at 6 n.22 (noting criticism of absence of broad partic-
ipation in IOSCO projects).
68. See supra Part IV.
69. See supra Part IV.
546 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:531
mediated systems so as to accommodate existing and future transactional 
patterns of financing and collateralization.70
To be more specific, one standard already discussed—and by far the 
most important one in my view—relates to intermediary risk.71 The standard 
might provide that investors should not be exposed to any risks arising out 
of post-settlement failure or default of an intermediary. But this standard 
would benefit from a penumbra of corollaries. For example, eliminating in-
termediary risk by connecting an investor directly with an issuer (that is, by 
disintermediation of holding) should not involve any sacrifice of transac-
tional flexibility when compared to current systems. And an investor should 
have access to and control over its securities for purposes of trading and col-
lateralization in a secure and user-friendly manner.72 As already suggested, 
that current systems cannot meet such a standard is an inadequate response. 
Meeting the Global Standards would be a job for Fintech to solve and for 
States to facilitate by making any necessary changes in private laws and 
regulations.
VI. Conclusion
Intermediaries such as stockbrokers and banks are ubiquitous in global 
securities markets. They play essential roles in all aspects of the markets, 
including trading, settling trades, and post-settlement holding of securities. 
This Article focuses in particular on the roles of intermediaries in securities 
holding systems. It proposes an IOSCO-led “soft-law-to-hard-law” ap-
proach to the development of Global Standards for reforms to these holding 
systems. The reforms would embrace not only important standards of a 
functional and regulatory nature, such as the principles addressed in 
IOSCO’s Client Asset Reports, but also would address holistic standards 
relating as well to the private law, insolvency law, and the technical aspects 
of infrastructures for securities holding systems. The Global Standards envi-
sioned here, however, would not propose model text or even doctrinal rules. 
Instead, they would establish the results that holding systems should 
achieve, such as the elimination of intermediary risk.
70. See Joanna Benjamin, Stewardship and Collateral, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 312 (2017).
71. See supra Part IV.
72. For example, the crude forms of intermediation that have grown up around crypto-
currencies (“wallets,” “cold storage,” and the like) would be unacceptable for a holding sys-
tem for publicly traded securities. See Adham, supra note 55 (discussing such intermediation). 
For a good first step toward the licensing and regulation of non-bank, non-broker-dealer in-
termediaries for crypto-currency, see UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY 
BUSINESSES ACT (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2017); see also UNIFORM SUPPLEMENTAL 
COMMERCIAL LAW FOR THE UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES 
ACT (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018) (adapting U.C.C. art. 8 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2018) for crypto-currency held by securities intermediaries). For an overview of 
these uniform laws, see Fred Miller, A New Payment Method and More, 72 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 119 (2019).
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As the principal organization for the coordination and cooperation 
among securities market regulators, and with a track record of producing 
excellent and important studies and reports, IOSCO is singularly well suited 
to lead the development of Global Standards. Ideally, it would do so with 
the participation and cooperation of bank regulators and central banks as 
well as the securities and banking industries. But the development of holis-
tic Global Standards for securities holding systems would face challenges.
One challenge would be to confront the need for reforms to the private 
law. Here, cooperation of legal professionals (practitioners, judges, and aca-
demics) would be essential. Involvement of organizations with relevant ex-
perience such as UNIDROIT and the European Commission also would be 
crucial. Another set of challenges would arise from the importance of con-
sidering reforms to the holding infrastructures (for example, increased 
transparency in holding systems). But the ongoing and increasing role of 
Fintech in the financial markets means that securities (and other) regulators 
must face these challenges in any event. Possibly the most difficult chal-
lenges would arise from within the securities industry. One could expect re-
sistance from market participants who (quite understandably) wish to pre-
serve their positions and roles in the securities markets and their current and 
future business plans. But this is one of the principal reasons that regulators 
(through IOSCO in particular) should play a leading role in the process, alt-
hough participation of industry obviously would be important.
Finally, a useful next step might be a high level, broadly representative, 
working conference to discuss prospects for Global Standards and to plan 
and organize their development. The past efforts of UNIDROT in the area 
of capital markets, in particular in the adoption of the GSC and the promul-
gation of the Legislative Guide, would commend it as an organizer and 
sponsor of such a conference. I hope that this Article might provoke further 
discussions and ultimately affirmative steps toward the development of 
Global Standards for securities holding systems.

